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Introduction
Few books in the tradition of analytic philosophy have been as controversial
as Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophico. One of the main reasons
for this, is that the work is very obscure. Another reason is that some of
the work's conclusions are highly paradoxical. According to the book's last
remarks, those who truly understand the import of the Tractatus, will come
to see that it is essentially a work of nonsense. Still, there is one thing that
Wittgenstein is very clear about in the Tractatus. And that is the work's
purpose: \the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather not to
thought, but to the expression of thoughts".1 But consider now something
else: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. In it, Kant writes that his purpose
is to set upon an inquiry into the limits of human reason, i.e., to come to
a \determination of the rules and boundaries of its use".2 It seems, then,
that Wittgenstein's philosophical motivations with the Tractatus seem rather
similar to those that Kant had with the rst Critique.
1See (Wittgenstein; 1921, p. 3) (my emphasis). In my references to the Tractatus I
have made use of the English translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. However,
when citing passages from the Tractatus, I will usually just mention the numbers of the
propositions in which they gure.
2See (Kant; 2000, p. 103). I will make use of the English translation by Paul Guyer
and Allen W. Wood.
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In this paper, I want to elaborate on the idea of treating Wittgenstein
as a Kantian philosopher. Of course, I do not mean to say that Wittgen-
stein was actually a follower of Kant. In fact, there are many philosophical
dierences between the two thinkers. Rather, what I want to propose is
that the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was Kantian in spirit. First of all,
Wittgenstein's overall conclusions seem in many ways to resemble, at least
in their outward appearance, those of Kant. Second, Wittgenstein can be
said to resemble Kant in his essentially transcendental outlook, in particular
his transcendental conclusions about the limits of language.3
This paper consists of two parts. In the rst part, I will give a summery of
the philosophical ideas behind Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and the intellectual
context out of which it arose. Because there are so many interpretations of
the Tractatus, I believe it is important to do this. In this way, I hope to
establish some common ground. Moreover, it is my opinion that, in many of
the discussions on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, too little attention is given to
the actual philosophical problems that seem to have motivated Wittgenstein.
Although my characterization of the Tractatus will be, given the connes of
this paper, relatively brief, I hope that I will nevertheless be able to provide
some insight into this. In the second part, I will go into the issue of treating
Wittgenstein as a Kantian philosopher. I will be mostly concerned with
the particularly transcendental, or \critical", outlook that characterizes the
philosophical thoughts behind the Tractatus. However, I will also take a
brief look at the similarities between Wittgenstein and Kant when it comes
to their \ethical" conclusions.
One of the reasons that I want to elaborate on this topic, is that I have
always vaguely understood Wittgenstein as a kind of Kantian philosopher; a
proposition that, as far as I can discern, has not been much elaborated on in
the literature. The present paper gave me an opportunity to give some more
articulation to my own intuitions about the matter. Moreover, this paper
3As shall become more clear shortly, the term `transcendental' needs to be understood
as having to do with so-called \conditions of possiblity".
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was written for an undergraduate course on anti-metaphysical thinkers of
the 20th century (Heidegger, Carnap, and Wittgenstein). Given the topic of
the course, the idea of showing that Wittgenstein's thought is in many ways
similar to that of Kant (a thinker whose philosophy can also be labeled as
`anti-metaphysical') seemed to me of signicance.
I The Tractatus Logico-Philosophico
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophico was published in the year 1922.
The work is dicult to understand. This is in part due to the work's highly
idiosyncratic style and make-up. The work is composed as a collection of
numbered propositions. To be more precise; the work consists of seven main
propositions, each of which gets commented on by further sub-propositions.
For example, the work starts with proposition 1 \The world is all that is
the case", and is followed by sub-proposition 1.1 \The world is the totality
of facts, not of things", and proposition 1.11 \The world is determined by
the facts, and their being all the facts".4 As Wittgenstein makes clear in a
footnote, the number of decimals that is assigned to a proposition indicates
the \logical importance" of the proposition { the more decimals, the less
importance.5 The seven main propositions are listed below.
1. The world is all that is the case.
2. What is the case { the fact { is the existence of states of aairs.
3. A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4. A thought is a proposition with sense.
5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
4Emphasis from original text.
5Interestingly, Erik Stenius compares the structure of the Tractatus to a musical com-
position (Stenius; 1960, p. 1-17).
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6. The general form of a truth-function is [p; ;N; ()].
This is the general form of the proposition.
7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
Another reason why the Tractatus is such a dicult work of philosophy,
is that Wittgenstein nowhere clearly states what exactly the philosophical
problems are that he is trying to solve. To illustrate, although Wittgenstein
states in the Preface \...the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated
seems to me unassailable and denitive. I therefore believe myself to have
found, on all essential points, the nal solution of the problems", he nowhere
explicitly states what these problems are.
According to G.E.M. Anscombe, however (one of Wittgenstein's students)
the key to the Tractatus is to consider it against the background of the philo-
sophical project of Betrand Russell, and especially, Gottlob Frege (something
which, according to Anscombe, many have failed to do).6 Wittgenstein also
hints at this himself, when he say in the Preface \...I am indebted to Frege's
great work and to the writings of my friend Mr Betrand Russell for much of
the stimulation of my thoughts".7 But what are the problems that motivated
Frege and Russell?
Both Frege and Russell were concerned with two things.8 First, both
Frege and Russell were concerned with the foundations of mathematics. More
specically, they wanted to show that mathematics in fact rests on principles
that are purely logical. Such a conception of mathematics was at the time
rather unorthodox. The neo-Kantians of Frege's 19th century Germany, and
the British Idealists that were working at the British Universities during Rus-
sell's earlier years as an academic philosopher, all adhered to some form of
the Kantian view that the reality of mathematics is ultimately based in the
6(Anscombe; 1965, p. 12-13)
7(Wittgenstein; 1921, p. 4)
8I have based much of my account here on Chapter 2 and 3 of (Kenny; 2006b). Addi-
tional sources are referred to in the text.
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faculty of human intuition.9 Frege's anti-psychologism, and Russell's \revolt
against idealism", must be seen in connection with their attempts to give a
foundation of mathematics that is based on pure logic, rather than human
subjectivity. Second (and this is related to their preoccupations with the
foundations of mathematics), both Frege and Russell were concerned with
developing an adequate theory of logic itself. In formulating their theories
about the nature of logic, Frege adopted an essentially formal-axiomatic ap-
proach, while Russell also adopted, in addition, an appraoch that was more
epistemological. In addition, Russell was also, much more than Frege, inter-
ested in the power of logic to solve traditional philosophical problems.
Something of interest here is Frege's attempt of giving a logical denition
of the natural numbers. Frege's motivation behind this was that, if such a
denition can be given, the mathematical concept of number can be dened
entirely in non-mathematical terms. Frege thought that he could succeed
in doing this by dening the natural numbers in terms of classes of classes
that have a similar number of members. On the face of it, such a way
of dening the numbers seems circular. However, Frege came up with the
insight that, for example, a waiter can observe that each plate on a table
has a knife lying next to it without knowing how many plates there on the
table. Similarly, Frege thought that we can simply dene, say, the number
5, as the class of all classes that have the same amount of members as, say,
the class of Aristotelean elements. A similar thing would be possible for the
other natural numbers.
However, the fact that there was a philosopher named Aristotle, whose
metaphysics happened to contain ve elements, is merely a contingent fact.
It would seem, then, that if we dene the natural numbers in this way, that
the possibility of dening a natural number is dependent on a contingent
fact, and consequently, that the natural numbers themselves are contingent
entities. This, however, runs counter to Frege's contention that a number is
9For an historical overview of the intellectual climate in which Frege and Russell found
themselves, see (Friedman; 2000) and (Hylton; 1990).
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a self-subsistent object.10 Again, what is needed is a denition of number
that is purely logical. Only in this way are numbers prevented from being
merely contingently dened entities.
Frege's solution is ingenious. His suggestion is that we should rst begin
with the denition of the natural number zero, and dene it as the class
of classes that have as many members as the class whose members are not
identical to themselves. The only class whose members are not identical with
themselves is the empty set ;, and is so purely of necessity. Thus, 0 = f;g.
The rest of the natural numbers can be dened by means of the denition
of zero: the number one can be dened as the class of classes that have as
many members as the class of the null-class, and the number two can be
dened as the class of classes with the same amount of members as the null-
class or the amount of members of the class of null-classes (i.e. 1 = ff;gg
and 2 = ff;g; ff;ggg) etc. In this way, Frege seems able to derive all the
natural numbers by using only concepts that are exclusively logical. In eect,
the prospect of reducing mathematics to logic seemed to have been greatly
enhanced by Frege.
Russell was deeply impressed by Frege's work. However, he famously
pointed out a fatal aw with Frege's way of dening the natural numbers.
On Frege's account, it seems that there are no restrictions when it comes to
forming classes of classes, and classes of classes of classes...etc. But Russell
showed that when we construct a certain very special class, namely, the class
of classes that are not a member of themselves, an inevitable paradox arises.
The paradox arises when we try to determine whether this class is a member
of itself. For it seems that if we say that it is not a member of itself then,
by denition, it seems that it is a member of itself. But if it is a member
of itself, then it follows by denition that it can't in fact be a member of
itself, and so on ad innitum. The conclusion: there is something logically
suspicious about the unrestricted formation of new classes.
10(Kenny; 2006a, p. 355-366)
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In response to these problems, Russell set out to develop a \theory of
types"; a theory about the proper application of concepts or \types". The
basic idea behind such a theory is that what can be meaningfully said about
individuals, cannot necessarily be meaningfully said about classes of individ-
uals. The same goes for classes of classes, and classes of classes of classes,
and so forth. A theory of types, then, is a theory which states the rules
that determine which concept applications are allowed and which ones are
not. According to Russell, if only we have an adequate theory of this sort,
paradoxes of the aforementioned kind will not arise anymore.
Let us now turn to Wittgenstein, for he gives a very interesting criticism
of Russell's conception of a theory of types. For according to Wittgenstein,
the problem with a theory of types is that it actually cannot be stated in
language. A theory of types can be seen as a set of rules that prescribe
syntactical rules of meaningful propositions. However, in stating these rules,
we would already have tomake use of these very rules. And hence, a theory of
types would essentially be superuous. According to Wittgenstein, the only
way in which you could set out the syntactical rules of a language without
presupposing them, would be to express them in a language that is itself
illogical. But the problem with such a language is that it cannot possibly
have any expressive power.
According to Wittgenstein, Russell's mistake is to make use of semantics
in constructing a theory of syntax (3.331). Yet, Wittgenstein thinks that
the proper syntactical use of symbols is something that is evident on the
basis of the symbols alone. In other words, if two symbols are not allowed to
combine in a certain way, this must be clear from the symbols themselves,
independent of what the symbols mean. In connection to this, Wittgenstein
says \Logic must look after itself" (5.473), and \Logic is transcendental"
(6.13).
This brings us to one of the main ideas of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein
thinks that a theory of logic, in the way Frege and Russell envisaged it, is
impossible. Logic is not something about which we can say something, such
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that we can develop a meaningful theory about it. Rather, the nature of logic
can only show itself. Thus, Wittgenstein states \my fundamental idea is that
the logical constants are not representatives; that there can be no represen-
tatives of the logic of facts" (4.0321).11 Without going into all the technical
diculties, the point that Wittgenstein wants to make is that, in order to say
something meaningful, one has to express what one wants to say by means
of a representation. However, logic is precisely what makes representation
possible in the rst place. Logic is what is doing the representing { logic is
the very medium of representation. There can be no theory of logic, because
logic is what makes theories possible in the rst place.12
I believe that it is against this background that we ought to understand
Wittgenstein's statement, in the Preface of the Tractatus, that the problems
of philosophy are simply the result of a misunderstanding of the logic of
language.13 And when he says \the truth of the thoughts that are here com-
municated seems to me unassailable and denitive. I therefore believe myself
to have found, on all essential points, the nal solution of the problems"14,
I take him to mean that he thought to have solved the kind of philosophical
problems that especially occupied Frege and Russell. Or perhaps we should
say that he did not so much solve their problems as dissolve them.15 But how
does Wittgenstein's rejection of a theory of logic relates to the seven main
theses of the Tractatus ; i.e., how does it relate to the work's actual contents?
Recall that Wittgenstein states in the Preface, that his aim is to draw
the limits of the expression of thoughts in language. Wittgenstein clearly
thought that theories such as those of Frege and Russell about the nature
of logic, violate these limits. The Tractatus can be seen as a more general
account of how it is that things can be said at all, and with that, an insight
into why it is that some things cannot in fact be said. Wittgenstein's `picture
11My emphasis.
12(Stokhof; 2009, p. 217)
13(Wittgenstein; 1921, p. 3)
14(Wittgenstein; 1921, p. 4)
15(McGinn; 2009, p. 31)
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theory of meaning' plays a key role here: only if an expression (a proposition)
actually depicts, does it say something. Clearly, Wittgenstein thought that
the propositions that constitute theories of logic such as those of Frege and
Russell do not depict anything.
The picture theory of meaning is a thesis about how it is possible for
propositions to link up to the world, such that propositions can actually say
something about the world.16 According to the picture theory of meaning, a
proposition says something to the extent that it is a picture of a fact. This
picturing relationship is possible, according to Wittgenstein, because there
exists a structural similarity between world and language. This structure
is inherently logical: \What any picture, of whatever form, must have in
common with reality, in order to be able to depict it correctly or incorrectly
in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality" (2.18). To see how
this works, we need to take a look at Wittgenstein's ontological theses about
the structure of the world, and how he thinks this structure is mirrored in
language.
Proposition 1 of the Tractatus famously says \The world is all that is
the case", proposition 2 reads \What is the case - the fact - is the existence
of states of aairs". Thus, according to Wittgenstein the world is basically
a totality of states of aairs. A state of aairs has a particular structure,
and it is in virtue of this structure that propositions can latch on to them.17
Simply put, a state of aairs is a contingently existing complex of simple
objects (2.03) (2.032). The objects themselves, however (Wittgenstein calls
them the \substance of the world" (2.021)), exist necessarily. Wittgenstein
16(Black; 1970, p. 11)
17There is some diculty here, however. Wittgenstein made a distinction between a
Tatsache and a Sachverhalt, and it is not entirely clear what Wittgenstein had in mind
with this distinction. For example, in (Stenius; 1960) we read that a Sachverhalt is a
merely possible state of aairs, while a Tatsache is an actual state of aairs. But in
(Black; 1970) we read that both Tatsache and Sachverhalt should be understood as terms
for state of aairs that are actual. To keep things simple, I will go with Black, and treat
Tatsache and Sachverhalt as actual states of aairs, and I will only use the one term `state
of aairs'.
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furthermore points out that it is in the nature of objects that they must
enter into one complex or another; each object being dened by several of
such possibilities. Altough it is contingent into which possible complex they
enter; that they enter into complex is necessary. Thus, as Max Black has
pointed out, we may regard Wittgenstein's ontology as both atomistic and
organic at the same time.18
Just as states of aairs are complexes of objects that are related to each
other in a certain determinate way, Wittgenstein takes language to consist of
elementary propositions whose internal structure consists of a set of names
that syntactically relate to each other in a specic way. In this way, the
names in an elementary proposition refer to the simple objects of reality,
and their syntactical composition is structurally similar to the way ub which
these objects contingently happen to related to one another. It is in virtue of
this structural similarity, that propositions can stand in a depictive relation
to the world.
To be sure, in many instances, we are misled into thinking that our ex-
pressions are genuine depictive propositions, while in fact, this is not actually
the case. As we have seen, this is especially so with the kind of propositions
that constitute the theories of logic a la Frege and Russell. But what should
also be noted, is that the fact that a proposition is depictive, does not imply
that the proposition is also true. This has to do with the fact that much more
possible states of aairs can be pictured in a proposition, in comparison to
the collection of states of aairs that are actually the case. Or better, propo-
sitions are only contingently true, and their truth can only be determined
through a comparison with reality. In other words, \there are no pictures
that are true a priori" (2.225).
What is important to note is that, although Wittgenstein thinks that
no depictive propositions are true a priori, he does think that propositions
of logic are true a priori. However, according to Wittgenstein, all proposi-
tions of logic are tautological in nature, and do not actually say anything.
18(Black; 1970, p. 28)
10
Instead; proposition of logic show their truth (just as contradictions show
their falsehood). In connection to this, Wittgenstein states that propositions
of logic are not so much nonsensical (such as the nonsesical proposition `The
Good is more or less Identical to the Beautiful' (4.003), as they are senseless.
Nevertheless, propositions about logic, such as those that make up the kind
of Fregean and Russelian theories of logic, are nonsensical.
To conclude this brief exposition of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, something
needs to be said about the Tractatus ' nal remarks concerning ethics (and
aesthetics).19 According to Wittgenstein, nothing can be genuinely said
about ethics (6.421). Everything that we attempt to say about ethics is
necessarily nonsensical. However, Wittgenstein nevertheless seems to think
that there is more to life than logic and contingency. He states \There are,
indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves man-
ifest. They are what is mystical" (6.522). Elsewhere, in I: A lecture on
Ethics, he says about ethics \it is a document of a tendency in the human
mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for
my life ridicule it".20 He also famously stated that the Tractatus contains
two parts: the written part and the part that was not written. And that this
latter part was in fact the most important.21 Concerning the things that are
most important to us, it is impossible to really say something. Hence, the
nal conclusion of the Tractatus : \What we cannot speak about we must
pass over into silence" (7).
II The Kantian Elements of the Tractatus
There is much to say for the idea that there is something inherently Kantian
about the kind of philosophy that is expounded in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
I believe that this resemblance has two components. First, it can be argued
19Wittgenstein thought that the ethics and aesthetics are one the same (6.421). So his
claims about ethics can be taken to concern aesthetics as well.
20(Wittgenstein; 1965, p. 12)
21(Wittgenstein; 1971, p. 16)
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that Wittgenstein's Tractatus presents us with an essentially transcendental
approach to philosophical problems. In other words, just like Kant's rst
Critique, the Tractatus presents us with a theory about certain conditions
of possibility. Second, the place of "ethics" in Wittgenstein's Tractatus is
very similar to the place that \morality" takes in the critical philosophy of
Kant. That is, just as the moral dimension of human existence lies outside
the bounds of theoretical knowledge, the ethical is essentially outside the
realm of what can be meaningfully said. Of course, there are also important
dierences between Wittgenstein and Kant. In what follows, I shall attempt
to make the comparison more thoroughly.
Now I assume that the reader will be familiar with Kant's critical phi-
losophy. However, just to be sure, I shall give a brief characterization of
it.
Kant's intention with the Critique of Pure Reason is to set upon an in-
quiry into the limits of human reason so as to come to a \determination of
the rules and boundaries of its use".22 One of the main problems that moti-
vated Kant, was to account for the possibility of geometry, mathematics, and
the natural sciences. Kant thought that a proper account of these sciences
depends on showing how synthetic a priori judgments are possible.23 A syn-
thetic a priori judgment can be dened as a judgment whose truth is logically
contingent (its negation does not imply a contradiction) but which neverthe-
less must be universally true. The famous example that Kant himself gives
is the relation of causality; that there should be a causal relation between
two empirical phenomena is not logically necessary, yet it is a universal truth
that the empirical world behaves according to causal laws. Kant's challenge
in the Critique is to give an account of such truths, and how it is that we
can come to know them.
Kant's solution to these problems was to hold that the truths of geom-
etry, mathematics, and the natural sciences, are basically a function of our
22(Kant; 2000, p. 103)
23(Kant; 2000, p. 146)
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cognitive apparatus. It is on account of the way in which our minds work
that, necessarily, we experience the world as a chain of causal events in space
and time. Also, it is because space and time have a certain structure, that
the truths of mathematics and geometry are as they are. In short, for the
human mind to cognize something at all, just is, at least in part, the act of
imposing a causal-spatiotemporal structure on something. Synthetic a priori
judgments are possible because what they exclusively concern the way our
minds work. They stipulate the necessary conditions that make it possible
for us to experience anything at all. Of course, we all know Kant's con-
clusion: the world as it is in itself, outside of human experience, cannot be
known. For to know is to think in terms of causality, space, and time. But
these categories only apply to the forms of human cognition. The upside to
this is, Kant thought, that human freedom and morality are saved from the
iron grip of Newtonian determinism.
Wittgenstein states in the Tractatus that \all philosophy is a `critique of
language"' (4.0031). I agree with Alfred Nordmann that we should interpret
this in a Kantian fashion.24 This leads to the following. Just as Kant dened
the limits of knowledge by means of a transcendental investigation into its
conditions of possibility, Wittgenstein determines the limits of what can be
meaningfully said, by means of an account of the conditions of possibility of
meaningful expression. Thus, we might say that thought's connement to the
constraint of depiction, when it comes to the limit of meaningful expression,
is in fact analogous to the intellect's connement to possible experience in
Kant's critical philosophy.
Wittgenstein's investigation into the limits of language is also entirely a
priori. Wittgenstein is not concerned with how languages actually happen to
express themselves in our actual world. Instead, Wittgenstein is concerned
with how the essential structure of any language must be, if it is to be able
to express anything at all. The distinction between the meaningful and the
meaningless is drawn entirely on a transcendental and a priori basis. This
24(Nordmann; 2005, p. 14)
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is similar to the way Kant approached the problem of synthetic a priori
judgments: if synthetic a priori judgments are to be possible at all, they
must be merely indicative of the universal structure of human cognition. Just
as Kant's account of human reason, Wittgenstein's approach to language is
"universalistic through and through".25
Wittgenstein's claims about the impossibility of a theory of logic also
bears much resemblance to Kant's contention that the pure concepts of the
understanding, taken by themselves, do not really add to our knowledge.
Kant thought that much of metaphysics erroneously tries to develop theories
about concepts such as causality, substance, totality, etc., in order to arrive
at a substantial theory of reality. However, Kant argued that only if these
concepts are applied to the world of experience do such concepts assist us in
the growth of our knowledge. Wittgenstein says the same about logic. No
theory of logic, especially those of the likes of Frege and Russell, can ever
add anything substantial. If one is to say anything substantial at all, logic
must already be presupposed and in perfect order. Therefore, we might say
that the attempt to say something about logic is basically what Kant calls a
\transcendental illusion".26
Recall that Wittgenstein states in the Tractatus that there can be no
representatives of the logic of facts (4.0312). In other words, truths about
logic cannot be represented. In connection to this, Wittgenstein also makes
the statement that a picture cannot depict its own form, but that it can only
show it (2.172). Again, we are reminded here of Kant. After all, Kant seems
to say something very similar about the form of our intuitions, when he says
that, although phenomena are always represented in space and time, space
and time cannot themselves be represented.27 Perhaps, then, Wittgenstein
took inspiration from Kant when he states \each thing is, as it were, in a space
of possible states of aairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot
imagine the thing without the space" (2.013). In any case, Wittgenstein's
25(Stokhof; 2009, p. 5)
26(Kant; 2000, p. 384)
27(Kant; 2000, p. 172-192)
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thesis that logic, being transcendental, cannot be itself represented, but is
rather the very medium of representation, has certainly a very Kantian ring
to it.
To get a better view on the relation between Wittgenstein and Kant,
we should also take into account the dierences between what they give
transcendental accounts of. The important dierence here is that, whereas
Kant's concerns are importantly epistemological, Wittgenstein is exclusively
concerned with semantics. As G.E.M. Anscombe explains, Wittgenstein is
of the opinion that epistemological considerations are in fact irrelevant to
semantics.28 In addition, Wittgenstein also himself states that philosophy,
conceived of as the critique of language, should not be confused with the the-
ory of knowledge (4.1121). So how does the semantic in Wittgenstein com-
pares to the epistemological in Kant? This question is not only of relevance
to our present purpose; the relation between epistemology and semantics is
also of philosophical signicance more generally.
However, I shall not argue for anything substantial here about the relation
between epistemology and semantics. Instead, my concern is more specically
how (and if) Wittgenstein's theory of meaning has inuenced Wittgenstein's
metaphysical view of reality. For Kant's transcendental investigation into the
conditions that make knowledge possible, led Kant to substantial metaphys-
ical conclusions about reality: empirical phenomena are essentially mental
constructs created by our minds, and reality as it is in itself is unknowable.
And thus the question is, does Wittgenstein's conception of the transcenden-
tal structure of language lead him to conclusions of a similar metaphysical
order?
To suggest that Wittgenstein should be considered s a Kantian philoso-
pher can easily give the impression that what is being suggested is that
Wittgenstein is some kind of idealist or anti-realist. However, such a view
of Wittgenstein seems, initially at least, very unlikely. For it seems that the
ontological theses at the beginning of the Tractatus, and their relation to the
28(Wittgenstein; 1921, p. 27-28)
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picture theory of meaning, amount to a metaphysical view that is thoroughly
realist. One important feature of realism is the thesis that statements are
characterized by bivalence; i.e. statements about reality are either true or
false independent from what we think about them.29 I believe few theses are
more typical of Wittgenstein than the thesis of bivalence. Wittgenstein ex-
plicitly states that any meaningful statement is either true or false, and that
whether it is true or false is entirely dependent on how things in the world
stand. Moreover, according to Wittgenstein, no meaningful proposition can
be known a priori(2.21 - 2.225). This means that we need to look at the
world to determine if what we say is true, and that the truth or falsehood of
a statement must be independent from what we think.
Although Wittgenstein's realism may seem un-Kantian at rst, the im-
portant thing to ask, is how Wittgenstein arrives at this metaphysical real-
ism. According to several authors, the fact that the seemingly ontological
theses of the Tractatus are placed at the beginning of the work is rather
misleading.30 In fact, we should understand the ontological theses as conse-
quences, rather than prerequisites, of Wittgenstein's transcendental concep-
tion of logic and language. For example, Max Black explains concerning the
way that Wittgenstein came to his own views \If I am not mistaken, then,
the order of investigation from the nature of logic to the nature of language
and thence to the nature of the world was roughly the reverse of the order
or presentation in the nal text".31 In a sense then, the Tractatus is similar
to Kant's transcendental deduction: meaningful expression transcendentally
necessitates that the names of the elementary propositions of language apply
to objects in reality.32 Again, it is clear that the Kantian element of the
Tractatus consists especially in its transcendehtal perspective.
If Wittgenstein is right, then the possibility of meaningful language tran-
29(Dummett; 1978)
30(Black; 1970), (Kenny; 2006b), & (McGinn; 2009)
31(Black; 1970, p. 8)
32Erik Stenius and Martin Stokhof make similar points. Stenius and Stokhof make
similar points. See (Stenius; 1960, p. 218) and (Stokhof; 2009, p. 217).
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scendentally requires metaphysical realism. A philosophically interesting
question, then, is to what extent a transcendental account of semantics has
precedence over a transcendental account of knowledge. If it turns out that
the limits of semantics have a decisive inuence on which kind of epistemo-
logical questions are even legitimate to ask, then, of course, this would have
important consequences. For example, transcendental truths about seman-
tics may preclude certain forms skepticism. Again, I shall not deal with this
very intricate issue here. To conclude I would like instead to look at another
point of contact between Wittgenstein and Kant.
Not only is Wittgenstein very similar to Kant in his transcendental per-
spective, his conclusions about ethics also appear very similar to those of
Kant. To be sure, Kant acknowledged the reality of human freedom and
morality. However, he thought that no theoretical knowledge is possible of
them. This is because, according to Kant, human freedom and morality can
never be objects of possible experience. And because theoretical knowledge
only extends as far as possible experience extends, no knowledge of human
freedom and morality is possible.33 However, Kant believes that our "con-
sciousness of the moral law", and the fact that we cannot help but to consider
ourselves as free agents, provide sucient grounds for supposing the reality
of morality.34
Admittedly, Wittgenstein's views on ethics are a lot more obscure. But
what is clear, is that he likewise puts ethics outside the reach of certain tran-
scendental limits. In I: A Lecture on Ethics Wittgenstein gives an explicit
account of why this is so.35 Briey put, Wittgenstein believes that every-
thing that can be meaningfully expressed is inherently contingent. However,
ethics deals with values that are absolute, and thus, necessarily, it cannot
be captured in contingent statements, whose truth essentially depend on the
randomness that constitutes the state of aairs that make up the world.
Hence, every attempt to say something meaningful about ethics is futile.
33(Kant; 2002, p. 69-77).
34(Kant; 2002, p. 152-155).
35(Wittgenstein; 1965).
17
However, as we have seen, although ethics does not belong to the realm
of what can be meaningfully put into words, Wittgenstein does clearly think
that there is a reality to ethics. However, it is a reality that can only be
shown: \There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They
make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical" (6.522). Where Kant
had to \deny knowledge in order to make room for faith"36, Wittgenstein feels
the need to set limits to the meaningful, in order to ward o the ethical (and
the aesthetical) from the pointlessness of contingency. As Martin Stokhof
states: \What Wittgenstein wants to do is to safeguard ethics from all kinds
of theorizing, from logical analysis, metaphysical speculation, and theological
dogma.. Ethics is about action...and it should be dealt with in that sphere".37
Lastly, it should perhaps be noted that although Wittgenstein's conclu-
sions about ethics appear to be very similar to those of Kant, there might
nevertheless be substantial dierences. Julian Young makes several com-
ments about this.38 For example, Young explains that although Kant was
deeply concerned with protecting religion and morality from the threat of
natural science, Wittgenstein's concern with ethics is very dierent. Accord-
ing to him, Wittgenstein's concern with ethics is more Schopenhauerian than
Kantian. Wittgenstein is not at all concerned with moral duty, and whether
or not an action is right or wrong. Instead, Wittgenstein concerns go out
to the problem of how to live a happy life that is free of suering. If this
is a correct way of understanding Wittgenstein, then his view on the eth-
ical stands in stark contrast with Kant's ethical views, according to which
the question of happiness seems of only minor concern to what is ethical or
moral. In any case, the fact that Wittgenstein was of the opinion that the
ethical and aesthetical are identical surely speaks in favor of the view that
Wittgenstein's approach to ethics had at least a more sensual dimension to
it compared to that of Kant.
36(Kant; 2000, p. 115)




There are many interesting points of contact between Wittgenstein's Tracta-
tus Logico-Philosophico and Kant's critical philosophy. Wittgenstein's simi-
larity to Kant primarily manifests itself in his transcendental perspective on
philosophical problems. First, Wittgenstein's transcendental account of logic
very much resembles Kant's transcendental theory of human cognition. In
connection to this, I have pointed out the link between Wittgenstein's rejec-
tion of the possibility of theories of logic of the kind that Frege and Russell
tried to develop, and Kant's notion of transcendental illusion. Wittgenstein's
thesis that every meaningful expression must be logically structured, but that
logic cannot itself be represented, is also of signicance here. For it is in sev-
eral ways similar to Kant's contention that, although all possible objects of
experience are necessarily represented in space and time, both space and
time themselves cannot be represented. Second, although Wittgenstein's re-
alism is radically opposed to Kant's transcendental idealism, in both cases
these metaphysical views are essentially transcendentally motivated. Finally,
I have showed that the place that ethics takes in Wittgenstein's thinking is
very similar to the place of morality in Kant's thinking. Both philosophers
postulate the reality of something beyond transcendental limits. Yet, as I
have also hinted at, there may nevertheless be subtle dierences between
Wittgenstein and Kant on this point. In any case, there are signicant and
interesting parallels between Wittgenstein's attempts to draw the limits of
language, and Kant's critical view of the limits of what can be humanly
known.
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